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The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” The Supreme Court has 
consistently maintained that the Fourth Amendment protects not only property interests, but also 
certain expectations of privacy. In Katz v. United States (1967), the Court held that when one 
“seeks to preserve something as private,” and his expectation of privacy is “one that society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable,” authorities need a warrant to collect that information. That 
standard has come to be known as the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test. A decade later, 
the Supreme Court created the Third Party Doctrine by ruling that any information shared with a 
third party fails the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test. The Court based this ruling on the 
premise that any information relinquished to a third party cannot reasonably be expected to 
remain private. My research suggests that premise is false. To measure what expectations of 
privacy society views as reasonable, I distributed a survey to a representative sample of 
Americans. A wide majority of respondents believe that someone’s call log, Google searches, 
Nest data, cellphone location, bank records, and email history can all reasonably be expected to 
remain private—even though that information is shared with a third party. These results are 
significant because they suggest that the Third Party Doctrine contradicts the Test upon which it 




One might be surprised to learn how much authority the “reasonable man” wields in the 
judiciary. The Supreme Court defers to the judgement of this reasonable man when it 
distinguishes between police brutality and justified conduct and when it determines negligence in 
tort law.1,2 In 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit even used the “reasonable 
man” test to decide whether “Whole Grain” Cheez-Its were labeled deceptively.3 (They were.) 
                                                 
1 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
2 Scalia, Antonin. “The rule of law as a law of rules.” University of Chicago Law Review. 56 (1989): 1181. 
3 The Editorial Board. “Cheez-Its and the Judiciary.” The Wall Street Journal. December 17, 2018. 
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While those domains are certainly important, perhaps the reasonable man’s greatest 
responsibility is differentiating between information that is entitled to privacy and information 
that is not. Specifically, the reasonable man is charged with determining whether a citizen’s 
personal digital records (such as bank records, phone records, and smart device data) can be 
accessed by the authorities without a warrant.  
The Supreme Court applies a reasonable expectation of privacy test to determine when 
police need a warrant to collect someone’s personal records. If it is “reasonable” to expect that 
the information in question will remain private, then the police need a warrant to access it. But 
expecting information that is shared with third parties to remain private has consistently been 
considered unreasonable by the Court. Because a “reasonable expectation of privacy” doesn’t 
attach to records stored by third parties, the police do not need a warrant to collect that 
information. Common examples of these third parties include phone service providers, financial 
institutions, and parent companies of smart technologies that store data, such as Amazon, Nest, 
and Google.4 The Court’s rationale is that information relinquished to a third party cannot 
reasonably be expected to remain private and thus is not protected by the Fourth Amendment. A 
famous application of this logic was the Supreme Court’s ruling that the Fourth Amendment 
allows for the warrantless collection of garbage from outside of a suspect’s home.5 So, in terms 
of Fourth Amendment protection, is the trash at the end of your driveway equivalent to your 
banking records? In the eyes of the Supreme Court, the answer is yes.  
This standard has come to be known as the Third Party Doctrine, and it has already been 
used to allow warrantless collection of email records, banking records, and internet browsing 
                                                 
4 Solove, Daniel J. Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1083, 
1089–114 (2002). 
5 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) 
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data.6 Consideration of this issue is important because as we continue to integrate advanced 
technologies into our daily lives, the Third Party Doctrine has the potential to erode our Fourth 
Amendment protection from searches and seizures conducted without a warrant. 
The Third Party Doctrine spawned from Justice Harlan’s “Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy Test,” first promulgated in Katz v. United States (1967).7 However, there is a critical 
distinction between the Third Party Doctrine and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test. 
The Test established that citizens are entitled to Fourth Amendment protections only if the 
government violates that citizen’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.” By contrast, the Third 
Party Doctrine argues that any information shared with a third party is automatically ineligible 
for Fourth Amendment protection because it lacks any reasonable expectation of privacy by 
virtue of its relinquishment.         
The Third Party Doctrine and Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test are fully 
compatible in some—perhaps even most—situations. Suppose, for instance, that during a 
celebratory dinner, you discuss your latest bank heist with your accomplice. If the conversation 
is loud enough that patrons sitting in the next booth overhear your conversation and report you to 
the police, you cannot claim that your Fourth Amendment right was violated. There is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy when openly discussing your crimes in public. The tension 
between the Doctrine and the Test only emerges when the third party information in question can 
reasonably be expected to remain private.  
Today, third parties have access to more data than ever before. Americans unwittingly 
share heaps of data with third parties daily: Every phone call, email, text, ATM withdrawal, and 
                                                 
6 Duarte, Natasha H. The Home Out of Context: The Post-Riley Fourth Amendment and Law Enforcement 
Collection of Smart Meter Data, 93 N.C. L. Rev.1140, 1142 (2015). 
7 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
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debit card purchase that you make is shared with a third party. If you have a smartphone, your 
location is automatically shared with a third party. Any conversation that you have with an 
Amazon Alexa is stored in the cloud (a third party).8 If you happen to install a Nest Learning 
Thermostat in your home, it “can use sensors and your phone’s location to check if you’ve left, 
then set itself to an Eco Temperature to save energy.”9 If we view this energy-saving technique 
through the lens of the Third Party Doctrine, we quickly see that law enforcement agents can 
legally check whether someone was home at a particular time by subpoenaing Nest and then 
examining that specific person’s Nest records.  
The goal of this paper is to objectively determine which expectations of privacy society 
views as reasonable. We can then use that information to discern whether the Third Party 
Doctrine has become obsolete. But there is still one problem: In the words of Justice Gorsuch, 
“we still don’t even know what [the] reasonable expectation of privacy test is. Is it supposed to 
pose an empirical question (what privacy expectations do people actually have) or a normative 
one (what expectations should they have)?”10 This paper will assuage Justice Gorsuch’s concerns 
by first demonstrating why the Test is an empirical question best answered by utilizing a 
representative sample of Americans and then objectively measuring what privacy expectations 
society views as reasonable by analyzing my findings. 
 Justice Gorsuch contends that judges “are hardly the representative group you’d expect 
(or want) to be making empirical judgements for hundreds of millions of people,” and existing 
research indicates that many judicial rulings fail to accurately portray public views.11,12 
                                                 
8 Kruzel, John. “Is Your Amazon Alexa Spying on You?” Politifact. May 31, 2018. 
9 Nest.com Home Page. 
10 Justice Gorsuch’s Dissenting Opinion, Carpenter v. United States (2018). 
11 Ibid, 10. 
12 Slobogin & Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An 
Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 Duke L. J. 727, 732, 740–742 
(1993). 
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Disseminating a survey to a large enough sample of Americans allays both concerns. Who better 
to make an “empirical judgement for hundreds of millions of people” than a representative 
sample of those hundreds of millions of people? And who better to accurately portray public 
views than the public itself? Treating the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test as a normative 
question misconstrues Justice Harlan’s original intent. He specified that society is charged with 
determining which expectations of privacy are objectively reasonable, not determining which 
expectations of privacy should be viewed as reasonable.  
To objectively ascertain which expectations of privacy society views as reasonable, I 
created and distributed a survey that asked Americans to indicate which information shared with 
third parties (e.g., phone records, bank records, and internet searches) can reasonably be 
expected to remain private.  One possible outcome of my research is that respondents conclude 
that certain information shared with third parties can reasonably be expected to remain private. 
In this scenario, the Third Party Doctrine conflicts with the Test upon which it is based. And if 
the link between the Third Party Doctrine and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test is 
shattered, then the Doctrine loses its legal basis. The other potential outcome is that respondents 
agree with the premises underlying the Third Party Doctrine, concluding that information shared 
with third parties cannot reasonably be expected to remain private. Either result helps clarify the 









Origin of the Third Party Doctrine 
The Supreme Court first applied the Third Party Doctrine in the case of Smith v. 
Maryland (1979), which involved the robbery of Patricia McDonough.13 When asked if she 
could identify her robber, Ms. McDonough was only able to give a description of her assailant’s 
vehicle: a 1975 Monte Carlo.14 In the days following her robbery, Ms. McDonough began 
receiving anonymous, threatening phone calls that ultimately directed her to stand on her porch 
and watch that same Monte Carlo drive by. The police spotted the Monte Carlo in Ms. 
McDonough’s neighborhood and matched the license plate number to Michael Lee Smith.15 
Without a warrant, the police contacted Mr. Smith’s phone company and requested that a pen 
register––a device that stores the list of phone numbers dialed by a particular telephone––record 
the numbers dialed from the telephone in Mr. Smith’s home. Later that week, the pen register 
notified the police that Mr. Smith had placed a call to Ms. McDonough. Only after this alert did 
the police secure a warrant to further investigate Mr. Smith. After being identified by Ms. 
McDonough in a lineup, Mr. Smith was sentenced to six years in prison.16 
 Mr. Smith appealed his case on the grounds that the police’s use of a pen register without 
a warrant violated his Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Fourth Amendment protections are only granted if 
the government violates an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.” Mr. Smith’s 
actions, according to the Court, were not entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy because 
                                                 
13 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
14 “Smith v. Maryland.” Cornell’s Legal Information Institute.  
15 Ibid, 13. 
16 Ibid, 13. 
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he “voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company,” and the Fourth 
Amendment does not apply to information that is shared with third parties.17  
  If my experimental survey provides strong evidence that Americans feel that their digital 
records––even though they are shared with a third party––can reasonably be expected to remain 
private, then the legal basis for Third Party crumbles. But what exactly does a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” mean?  
 
The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test 
 In 1967, federal law enforcement agents suspected that Charles Katz was transmitting 
gambling information to his associates over the phone, so they planted a recording device in the 
public telephone booth that Mr. Katz frequently used.18 The F.B.I. did not secure a warrant 
before doing so. Based on these recordings, Mr. Katz was convicted on eight counts of illegal 
transmission of wagering information.19 Mr. Katz appealed his conviction, arguing that planting 
an eavesdropping device in a phone booth to record his calls violated his Fourth Amendment 
protection from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
disagreed, noting the “absence of a physical intrusion into the phone booth itself.”20 
 The Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit’s ruling and established several 
precedents that are relevant to the Third Party Doctrine in the process. First, the Court held that 
governmental violation of a citizen’s “justifiably relied upon” privacy constitutes a search and 
seizure within the context of the Fourth Amendment.21 Second, Fourth Amendment protections 
                                                 
17 Ibid, 14. 
18 “Katz vs. United States.” Cornell’s Legal Information Institute. 
19 Ibid, 18. 
20 Ibid, 18. 
21 Katz vs. United States. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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extend beyond tangible items.22 Third, although the F.B.I.’s case was strong enough that it would 
have received a warrant if it had filed for one, the surveillance of Mr. Katz “was not in fact 
conducted pursuant to the warrant procedure which is a constitutional precondition of such 
electronic surveillance.”23 In other words, even if authorities have ample evidence to believe that 
someone has committed a crime, they still may not circumvent the process of properly obtaining 
a warrant. The most significant precedent from this case is Justice Harlan’s Reasonable 
Expectation of Privacy Test. In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan held that citizens are 
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection if (1) the individual “has exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy,” and (2) “society is prepared to recognize that this 
expectation is (objectively) reasonable.”24 
 The first clause of the Test is simple to pass because it is nearly impossible to prove 
someone’s subjective expectations of privacy. (And anyone appealing a conviction by arguing 
that her Fourth Amendment right was violated will invariably maintain that she expected the 
incriminating information to remain private.) As a result, the Test hinges on whether society 
acknowledges that the information in question is reasonably––and objectively––expected to 
remain private.  
Perhaps recognizing the ever-changing nature of our country, Justice Harlan vested the 
power to determine whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable with “society,” implying that 
a reasonable expectation of privacy might apply to different types of information at different 
times. This means that we need not address what the public felt was a reasonable expectation of 
                                                 
22 Ibid, 21. 
23 Ibid, 21. 
24 Ibid, 21. 
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privacy when the Doctrine originated. Instead, we need to determine the expectations of privacy 
society feels are reasonable today. 
  
 
Modern Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence 
 In addition to establishing society’s perspective on privacy, it is also important to 
describe the Supreme Court’s recent precedent regarding the intersection of technology and the 
Fourth Amendment. The 2018 case of Carpenter v. United States might well represent an 
inflection point in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The case revolved around a series of armed 
robberies committed by four men in 2011.25 After being arrested, one robber confessed and 
provided the F.B.I. with his accomplices’ cell phone numbers. The F.B.I. then used the Stored 
Communications Act (instead of a warrant) to collect the date and time of the robbers’ phone 
calls and the robbers’ approximate location when those calls began and ended.26 Based on the 
cellphone information gathered, the F.B.I. arrested and charged Timothy Carpenter, who was 
later convicted. Mr. Carpenter appealed his conviction on the grounds that the warrantless 
collection of his cellphone data infringed his Fourth Amendment protection against warrantless 
searches and seizures. 
 The Supreme Court overturned Mr. Carpenter’s conviction, ruling that the government’s 
warrantless acquisition of his cellphone records violated the Fourth Amendment.27 In so holding, 
the Court reaffirmed that the Fourth Amendment protects expectations of privacy in addition to 
tangible property.28 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, conceded that “[t]his sort of 
                                                 
25 “Carpenter v. United States.” Cornell’s Legal Information Institute 
26 Ibid, 25. 
27 Carpenter v. United States. 585 U.S. ___ (2018). 
28 Ibid, 27. 
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digital data––personal location information obtained by a third party––does not fit neatly under 
existing precedents,” but noted that tracking a person’s movements is far more intrusive than 
precedents could have anticipated.29 Perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this paper, the 
Court held that “cell phone location information is not truly ‘shared’ as the term is usually 
understood,” implying that, contrary to the Third Party Doctrine, information relinquished to 
third parties can still be afforded Fourth Amendment protection. 
Equally important, Carpenter stopped short of repudiating the Third Party Doctrine, 
announcing that “[t]his decision is narrow. It does not express a view on matters not before the 
Court… does not address other business records that might incidentally reveal location 
information; and does not consider other collection techniques involving foreign affairs or 
national security.”30 Nevertheless, dissents censured the Opinion for “allow[ing] a defendant to 
object to a search of a third party’s property” and lamented the Court’s departure from the 
“original understanding” of the Fourth Amendment.31 The latter criticism is especially dubious. 
The Founders crafted the Fourth Amendment “as a response to the reviled ‘general warrants’ and 
‘writs of assistance’ of the colonial era, which allowed British officers to rummage through 
homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of criminal activity.”32 Indeed, as John Adams 
recalled, the patriot James Otis Jr.’s public excoriation of writs of assistance was “the first act of 
opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain” and even “helped spark the Revolution 
itself.”33,34 
                                                 
29 Ibid, 27. 
30 Ibid, 27. 
31 Ibid, 27. 
32 Riley v. California. 573 U.S. ____ (2014). 
33 Adams, John. 10 Works of John Adams 248. (C. Adams ed. 1856)  
34 Ibid, 27. 
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This paper was written less than nine months after Carpenter. As a result, at the time of 
this writing, there have been relatively few publications about the significance of the ruling. 
Some have argued that computers and the internet should trigger new Fourth Amendment rules 
for the digital age.35 Others justify the Carpenter ruling by emphasizing the distinction between 
information actively shared with third parties and information shared with third parties “without 
meaningful voluntary choice.”36 If that distinction is to be relied upon in the future, objectively 
determining what counts as a “meaningful” and “voluntary” choice will be of the utmost 
importance. That will be no small feat. If a third party sneaks a short clause deep within the 
bowels of its user agreement notifying people that their data is being collected, does that count as 
a meaningful and voluntary choice? What about similar clauses occurring in the first line of user 
agreements? There are myriad permutations of that scenario, and it will be interesting to see how 
the Court handles these questions in the future. 
Other scholars have argued that the Carpenter decision was handed down too late, and 
that both the legislature and the judiciary were too slow and ineffective when it came to adjusting 
the balance between security and privacy.37 To make up the ground, they claim, lower courts 
must not be reluctant to “confront the challenges of twenty-first-century technology.”38 Finally, 
although Carpenter signaled that the Court can be willing to protect privacy rights, some 
scholars contend that “Congress and state legislatures need to design a better system for ensuring 
that law enforcement is subject to public accountability before using powerful new surveillance 
tools [that may surface as technology improves].”39 
                                                 
35 Kerr, Orin S. The Digital Fourth Amendment. Oxford University Press. (forthcoming, as of March 3, 2019). 
36 Ibid, 32. 
37 Freiwald, Susan and Stephen Wm Smith. “The Carpenter Chronicle: A Near Perfect Surveillance.” 132 Harv. L. 
Rev. 205. 2018. 
38 Ibid, 34. 
39 Ibid, 34. 
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Despite the warm reception given to Carpenter by the academic community, there have 
not been any calls to entirely invalidate the Third Party Doctrine. More importantly, in the 
Carpenter decision, the Court was explicit in outlining the narrow application of their ruling. To 
better understand why, let us turn to the case for the Third Party Doctrine. 
 
 
The Case for the Third Party Doctrine 
  Justice Alito offers an intuitive argument in favor of the Third Party Doctrine. If it were 
invalidated, he contends, defendants would be allowed to object to the search of a third party’s 
property.40 This position assumes that digital information such as your location (as collected by 
your cellphone), is the “property” of a third party. That definition of property has been 
disputed.41 Another argument advanced by Justice Alito is that those who dismiss the Third Party 
Doctrine ignore the distinction between an “actual search (dispatching law enforcement officers 
to enter private property and root through private papers and effects)” and an “order merely 
requiring a party to look through its own records and produce specified documents.”42 The 
former, Justice Alito maintains, requires probable cause and a warrant. The latter does not.43 
However, as we continue to integrate advanced technology into our lives, the line between 
“private papers and effects” and a third party’s records will continue to blur. How the Court 
deals with this ambiguity going forward will be worth monitoring. 
Professor Orin S. Kerr offers another defense of the Third Party Doctrine. First, he argues 
that the Doctrine ensures and maintains “the technological neutrality of the Fourth 
                                                 
40 Justice Alito’s Dissenting Opinion in Carpenter v. United States. 
41 Ibid, 24. 
42 Ibid, 24. 
43 Ibid, 37. 
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Amendment.”44 This neutrality is important because “savvy wrongdoers could use third party 
services in a tactical way to enshroud the entirety of their crimes in zones of Fourth Amendment 
protection.”45 According to this viewpoint, the Third Party Doctrine stabilizes the balance 
between privacy and security and “blocks this end run-around the traditional Fourth Amendment 
balance.”46 At bottom, Professor Kerr contends that the Doctrine guarantees that the Fourth 
Amendment applies equally to crimes involving third parties and those that do not. 
 The second argument Professor Kerr advances is that it provides “ex ante clarity” for 
both the courts and the police.47 The exclusionary rule, which prohibits the use of illegally 
obtained evidence in a criminal trial, is the primary mechanism for enforcing the Fourth 
Amendment.48 To ensure that incriminating evidence is not suppressed because it was 
improperly obtained, the police need to know ahead of time when their conduct triggers Fourth 
Amendment protection.49 Professor Kerr claims that uncertainty in these situations can deter 
police from acting, even when it is well within their rights to do so. Therefore, he contends, part 
of the Doctrine’s virtue is that it minimizes uncertainty and allows the police to do their job to 
the best of their ability.  
 Finally, Professor Kerr argues, there have yet to be any viable alternatives proposed to 
supplant the Third Party Doctrine.50 And “if it takes a theory to beat a theory, then surely it takes 
a doctrine to beat a doctrine.”51 Therefore, he concludes, we should preserve the Third Party 
Doctrine until we can find a suitable replacement for it. 
                                                 
44 Kerr, Orin S. "The case for the third-party doctrine." Mich. L. Rev. 107 (2008): 561. 
45 Ibid, 22. 
46 Ibid, 22. 
47 Ibid, 22. 
48 Ibid, 22. 
49 Ibid, 22. 
50 Solove, Daniel J. Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1083, 
1086 (2002). 
51 Ibid, 22. 
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The purpose of this paper is not to rebut the arguments advanced in favor of maintaining 
the Doctrine, but rather to introduce them so that you can weigh them against the results of my 
survey. Research much like my own has previously been conducted to gauge public opinion 
about the nexus between technology and privacy. It is thus beneficial to investigate these prior 
findings before turning to my data so that we can note how opinions have changed––or remained 
the same––over time. 
 
The Nexus Between Privacy and Technology 
 People overwhelmingly believe that privacy is important.52 In one study, two-thirds of 
participants rated privacy as a “very important” concept, while less than one-tenth of respondents 
regarded privacy as “slightly or not important at all.”53 The same study found that pessimism 
about the future security of privacy rights waxed in the 1970s, waned slightly in the early 80s, 
and waxed again between 1985 and 1990, when the study was ultimately published.54 Between 
1974 and 1977, there was a large spike in the number of respondents who felt that organizations 
asked too much personal information of people. 55 However, the vast majority of people who 
shared this sentiment nevertheless chose to relinquish their private information so that they could 
potentially receive benefits from the organizations that collected their personal data.56 Between 
the 1970s and 1990s, it seems, people certainly valued their privacy, but few were willing to 
forgo any tangible benefits to protect it.  
                                                 
52 Katz, James E., and Annette R. Tassone. "A report: public opinion trends: privacy and information 
technology." The Public Opinion Quarterly 54, no. 1 (1990): 125-143 
53 Ibid, 31. 
54 Ibid, 31. 
55 Ibid, 31. 
56 Ibid, 31. 
 16 
 Others have argued that the threat to privacy “is rapidly becoming worse,” and that 
federal, state, and local governments must aggressively enact protective legislation.57 This call to 
arms, issued in 2004, warned Americans that private companies trade and sell personal data for 
profit.58 By 2018, this practice had only accelerated. Thasos, a company that “leases databases of 
trillions of geographic coordinates collected by smartphone apps,” is at the vanguard of 
corporations that use cellphone data to try to stay ahead of the stock market.59 “[Your cell phone] 
is creating this data all the time, even if it’s not ringing,” Thasos C.E.O. Greg Skibiski told the 
Wall Street Journal. “It’s a beacon. Every single person is carrying this beacon.”60 As of now, 
before suppliers sell data to Thasos, the data is scrubbed of all personally identifying 
information. Even though Thasos receives only “time-stamped strings of latitude and longitude,” 
the company says that it can accurately portray the ebb and flow of people and, correspondingly, 
their money.61 Mr. Skibiski said that Thasos’s largest clients are hedge funds, some of which pay 
over $1 million annually to have access to the data collected by millions of Americans’ cell 
phones.62 
It has also been well-documented that the data in these digital dossiers increasingly flows 
from the private sector to the government, particularly for law enforcement use.63 The 
constitutionality of law enforcement agents collecting these data without a warrant depends 
defining an intentionally vague clause: “a reasonable expectation of privacy.”  
                                                 
57 Solove, Daniel J. The digital person: Technology and privacy in the information age. N.Y.U. Press, 2004. 
58 Ibid, 36. 
59 Dezember, Ryan. “Your Smartphone’s Location is Worth Big Money to Wall Street.” The Wall Street Journal. 
November 2, 2018. 
60 Ibid, 38. 
61 Ibid, 38. 
62 Ibid, 38. 
63 Ibid, 36. 
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To the best of my knowledge, there have been no previous studies that have used public 
opinion to define an ambiguous legal phrase coined by the Supreme Court. (With good reason, I 
might add. The Court’s institutions were intentionally designed so that it would not be beholden 
to public opinion.64) The reason this paper utilizes a public opinion survey is because the 
architect of the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test explicitly tasked society with 
determining what counts as a reasonable expectation of privacy. The following sections outline 
the survey’s methodology and results.  
 
Methodology 
 To ascertain which expectations of privacy society views as reasonable, I composed a 
survey and distributed it to a random sample of 983 Americans using Qualtrics. The survey 
included eight questions: Six questions asked about the privacy of specific types of information, 
and two questions asked about demographics. We will begin by discussing the demographic 
questions and then move on to detailing the privacy questions. 
 The demographic questions were included to see if different cohorts have different 
opinions about what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy. For instance, do tech-savvy 
people have a different perspective than people who are don’t often use advanced technologies? 
Instead of directly asking respondents whether they are technologically skilled—a question that 
improperly assumes that every participant’s definition of  “skilled” is the same—I asked 
participants to select all of the following statements that apply to them: (1) I own a Google Home 
or Alexa device; (2) I own a smart thermostat, such as Nest; (3) I have created an online banking 
account that is linked to my credit or debit card; (4) My credit or debit card information is stored 
                                                 
64 Hamilton, Alexander. Federalist 78.  
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on at least one website, such as Amazon; (5) I have used an electronic money transferring app, 
such as Venmo, CashApp, or Zelle, before. Respondents to whom none of those statements 
applied were coded as zeros. Those to whom one statement applied were coded as ones, those to 
whom two statements applied were coded as twos, and so on. Those earning threes, fours, and 
fives were labeled “savvy”; those earning zeros, ones, and twos were labeled “inexperienced.”  
Although reasonable, there are arguments to be made that this is an imperfect method for 
determining someone’s tech-savviness. For one, wealthy people might own more technologies 
simply because they can afford to buy them. Whether they can effectively use those technologies 
might be another matter. By the same token, even if poor people are skilled at using technology, 
their access to technology might be limited. To mitigate these concerns, the question included 
three advanced technologies that are free: an online banking account, a money transferring app, 
and a website that stores credit card information. Still, it must be acknowledged that access to 
these services—though they are “free”—is unequal. Low income people might not have the bank 
account, computer, or phone necessary for utilizing these online resources.  
It was also interesting to determine whether people with firsthand experience with 
criminal proceedings have a different outlook than people who have never been investigated by 
the police. This inquiry is important because a common reaction to concerns about privacy issues 
is that “innocent people have nothing to hide.” To address this query, I added a second 
demographic question: “Have you, a close friend, or a member of your family ever been 
investigated in connection to a crime?” The question depersonalized the circumstances to combat 
social desirability bias and respondents’ reluctance to share information about their own criminal 
history. Respondents were presumably more forthcoming because there was no specification 
about whom their answers referred to. Affirmative answers meant either the respondent, the 
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respondent’s close friend, or the respondent’s family member was investigated for a crime. Apart 
from reducing social desirability bias, including close friends and family members in the 
question likely improves the internal validity of my results because the psychological effects of 
dealing with law enforcement extend beyond the immediate suspect.65 The demographic 
questions were listed at the end of the survey to prevent any priming from occurring. 
I introduced the privacy questions at the outset—without mentioning the Reasonable 
Expectation of Privacy Test or the Fourth Amendment—to promote candor and avoid priming. 
Each privacy question began by providing the necessary background information (i.e., question 
stem) to ensure that all respondents shared a minimum understanding of each topic. Providing 
background information was especially important for the question about Nest data. Many people 
don’t know what Nest is, let alone know how it works. I sought to balance thoroughness and 
concision in Nest’s question stem: 
New in-home thermostats (such as Nest) can detect whether people are home and 
adjust the temperature accordingly. These thermostats permanently store 
information about when people are home so that the device can look for patterns 
in order to become more energy efficient. 
 
Because of the topic’s familiarity among most Americans, the question about cellphone location 
didn’t require as much background information:  
Smartphones (such as iPhones and Androids) automatically track and 
permanently store the location of any person carrying a phone at any given time. 
  
The remaining question stems were written in the same style and conveyed the context necessary 
to effectively answer the corresponding question.  
                                                 
65 Greenberg, Martin S., and R. Barry Ruback. Social psychology of the criminal justice system. Monterey, CA: 
Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1982. 
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To avoid the confounding factors that might arise from altering the way the questions 
were asked, an identical directive followed each introductory sentence: “Please choose the 
statement that best describes your opinion about the privacy of this information.” As another 
safeguard against confounders, the answer choices for each survey question were identical. 
When determining expectations of privacy, there are only four alternatives: (1) the information 
can be reasonably expected to remain private from everyone; (2) the information can reasonably 
be expected to be shared with other businesses, but not the government; (3) the information can 
reasonably be expected to be shared with the government, but not other businesses; and (4) the 
information can reasonably be expected to be shared with both the government and other 
businesses. The answer choices were presented in that order. I acknowledge that this strategy 
leaves my survey vulnerable to the recency effect, but since the answer choices in my survey 
have an inherent order (greatest expectation of privacy to least expectation of privacy), I felt that 
scrambling that order would confuse respondents and limit the internal validity of my results.  
To review, each privacy question featured its own distinct introductory sentence to 
provide the necessary background information. From there, in order to minimize extraneous 
variables, the questions were identical. For example, the question about Nest data was worded as 
follows:  
New in-home thermostats (such as Nest) can detect whether people are home and 
adjust the temperature accordingly. These thermostats permanently store 
information about when people are home so that the device can look for patterns 
in order to become more energy efficient. Please choose the statement that best 
describes your opinion about the privacy of this information. 
 
A) I believe that it is reasonable for someone to expect that this 
information be kept private from everyone. 
B) I believe that it is reasonable for someone to expect that this 
information be shared with potential advertisers (but not the 
government). 
 21 
C) I believe that it is reasonable for someone to expect that this 
information be shared with the government (but not potential 
advertisers). 
D) I believe that it is reasonable for someone to expect that this 
information be shared with both the government and potential 
advertisers. 
 
And the question about cell phone service location: 
Smartphones (such as iPhones and Androids) automatically track and 
permanently store the location of any person carrying a phone at any given time. 
Please choose the statement that best describes your opinion about the privacy of 
this information.  
 
A) I believe that it is reasonable for someone to expect that this 
information be kept private from everyone. 
B) I believe that it is reasonable for someone to expect that this 
information be shared with potential advertisers (but not the 
government). 
C) I believe that it is reasonable for someone to expect that this 
information be shared with the government (but not potential 
advertisers). 
D) I believe that it is reasonable for someone to expect that this 
information be shared with both the government and potential 
advertisers. 
 
I intentionally used the word “reasonable” to ensure that my findings aligned closely with the 
intent of the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test. Thus, the results of this survey accurately 
portray the expectations of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable. Those results, in turn, 
allow us to empirically conclude whether the Third Party Doctrine has become logically 
inconsistent with the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test. 
If the data suggest society believes that some information shared with third parties can 
reasonably be expected to remain private from the government, then the Third Party Doctrine no 
longer flows from the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test. And if the Doctrine becomes 
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inconsistent with the test upon which it is based, then the legal foundation of the Doctrine 
collapses. However, if the data suggest society believes that you cannot reasonably expect 
information shared with third parties to remain private, then we can affirm that the Third Party 
Doctrine prevents the Fourth Amendment from being overapplied. Either result is important for 
clarifying when the Fourth Amendment proscribes warrantless collection of digital records. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 My findings show that the vast majority of Americans believe that someone’s call logs 
(73.4%), Google searches (72.9%), Nest data (82.1%), cellphone location (71.9%), bank records 
(72.2%), and email history (75.7%) can reasonably be expected to remain private from the 
government (see Figure 1). These results indicate that society recognizes information shared with 
third parties can nevertheless be entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy. It follows that 











Figure 1 The Percent of Americans that Believe There Is a Reasonable 
Expectation of Privacy from the Government by Data Type 
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Recall that Carpenter established that your location, as tracked by your cellphone, cannot  
be collected without a warrant because that information merits a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. This ruling implicitly created a threshold, represented by the red dotted line at 71.9% 
(which corresponds to the percent of society that believes it’s reasonable to expect your 
cellphone location to remain private). Any type of information that greater than 71.9% of society 
views as reasonably expected to remain private should also merit a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. As we can see, opinions about every type of information I studied exceed that threshold. 
To be consistent, these types of information should be entitled to a reasonable expectation of 
privacy as well. Therefore, if the Court continues to rely on the Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy Test to determine whether the police need a warrant to access information, then 
someone’s email history, banking records, Nest data, Google searches, and call logs can no 
longer be collected without a warrant.  
But, for over forty years, the Court has maintained that the police can warrantlessly 
collect someone’s banking records. Beginning with the 1976 case of United States v. Miller, the 
Court held that bank records are not entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy because they 
are “voluntarily conveyed to… banks.”66 In Carpenter, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Miller. 
One argument advanced in Miller was that the defendant’s financial records were not protected 
by a reasonable expectation of privacy because he could “assert neither ownership nor 
possession” of them because they were “business records of the banks.”67 The Court also held 
that the “nature” of bank records confirms why they have a limited expectation of privacy. As 
                                                 
66 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) 
67 Carpenter v. United States. 585 U.S. ___ (2018). 
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evidence of that argument, the Court pointed out that Miller’s bank statements contained 
information “exposed to [bank] employees in the ordinary course of business.”68  
The Court’s rationale in Miller contradicts the original Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy Test established in Katz. Rather than look to what society believes is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, the Court substituted its own interpretation. The results of my study 
suggest that a higher proportion of Americans believe banking records can reasonably be 
expected to remain private than believe cellphone location can be, but the Court ruled that a 
warrant is needed to access the latter, not the former. This contradiction violates both the rules of 
logic and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test.  
This inconsistency illuminates a tension between the standards relied upon in Miller and 
the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test (promulgated in Katz) that the Supreme Court must 
alleviate. It’s unlikely that the Court can continue to rely on both precedents in the future; 
applying Miller versus applying Katz leads to different conclusions in more cases than merely 
banking records. Let’s use Nest data as an example. I found that over 82% of Americans believe 
that someone’s Nest data is entitled to a reasonable expectation privacy. Under Katz, the police 
would need a warrant to collect that data. But under Miller, the police might not. As we will see, 
many of the same arguments advanced in Miller would also apply to a case involving Nest 
information. 
For one, customers of Nest know full well that they are buying a smart thermostat that 
can tell whether they are home. Indeed, that is the entire purpose of Nest. On the Nest homepage, 
one prominently displayed panel reads: “It knows when you’re away. You’re off to work. The 
Nest Thermostat can use sensors and your phone’s location to check if you’ve left, then sets 
                                                 
68 Ibid, 67. 
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itself to an Eco Temperature to save energy.”69 Thus, like Miller, the argument can readily be 
made that customers voluntarily convey their data to Nest devices. For another, as Justice 
Kennedy points out in his dissent in Carpenter, “individuals have no Fourth Amendment 
interests in business records which are possessed, owned, and controlled by a third party…even 
when the records contain personal and sensitive information.”70 Justice Kennedy cited Miller as 
evidence of that point. There is little doubt that the data tracking whether someone is home 
counts as “personal and sensitive,” but they are nevertheless “business records which are 
possessed, owned, and controlled by a third party.” As a result, if the Court used the framework 
adopted in Miller, it’s unlikely that the police would need a warrant to access someone’s Nest 
data. On the other hand, if the Court employed Katz’s Test, the police would certainly need a 
warrant to do so. This discrepancy deprives citizens, law enforcement agents, and judges of ex 
ante clarity in Fourth Amendment cases. To remedy this dilemma, the High Court must be 
consistent in choosing to apply either Miller or Katz, but not both.  
The second focus of my research was to determine whether technologically adept and 
inept respondents have different opinions about what constitutes a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. I found that they do. Across the board, tech-savvy respondents were more likely to 
believe that information shared with third parties cannot be expected to remain private from the 
government (see Figure 2). These differences are significant at the 95% confidence level. Indeed, 
they are all significant at the 99.9% confidence level apart from the question about Nest data 
(which had a p-value of 0.019).  The average difference in opinion between the tech-savvy group 
and the technologically inexperienced group was about 12.7 points. Despite this margin, wide 
majorities of both cohorts believe that all of the information that I studied merits a reasonable 
                                                 
69 Nest homepage. Available at https://nest.com/thermostats/nest-learning-thermostat/overview/  
70 Carpenter v. United States. 585 U.S. ___ (2018). Justice Kennedy’s Dissent. 
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expectation of privacy. Among the tech-savvy cohort, cellphone location was the type of 
information that the fewest respondents felt could reasonably be expected to remain private from 
the government (67.9%). This threshold is again represented by a red dotted line in Figure 2. 
Analyzing this control group is important because some might argue that the Supreme Court 
should determine digital expectations of privacy from the perspective of the technologically 
adept reasonable man. Even if the Court shared that sentiment, it would still be required to rule 
that collecting someone’s email history, bank records, Nest data, Google searches, and call logs 
also requires a warrant because among tech-savvy Americans, public opinion about that 











Another aim of my research was to measure the difference in opinion about what 
information is entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy between people who have 
experienced a criminal investigation and those who have not. The only difference in opinion 
between these cohorts that was statistically significant dealt with banking records (see Figure 3). 
Figure 2 The Percent of Americans that Believe There Is a Reasonable 
Expectation of Privacy from the Government by Data Type and Cohort 
 









There is about a 9 point gap between how each group views banking records: 73.7% of 
respondents without any experience with a criminal investigation believed those records could 
reasonably be expected to remain private from the government, while 64.8% of people who have 
experienced a criminal investigation felt similarly. Overall, respondents who haven’t experienced 
a criminal investigation tended to believe information could reasonably be expected to remain 
private from the government at a slightly higher rate than their counterparts who have 











 The final prong of my study assessed the evidence that would underlie a potential 
counterargument to the findings I’ve presented thus far. Supporters of the Third Party Doctrine 
might insist that the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test protects only information that can 
be expected to remain private from everyone, not information that is expected to remain private 
from merely the government. For argument’s sake, let’s assume that the Supreme Court adopts 
that viewpoint when applying the Test. Even still, a majority of Americans believe that 
Figure 3 The Percent of Americans that Believe There Is a Reasonable 
Expectation of Privacy from the Government by Data Type and Cohort 
 







No Experience with a Criminal Investigation
Direct Experience with a Criminal Investgation
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someone’s call log (57.5%), Google searches (54.2%), Nest data (64.7%), cellphone location 
(55.9%), bank records (57.2%), and email history (59.0%) can reasonably be expected to remain 
private from everyone (see Figure 4). The Carpenter threshold (at 55.9%) is again represented by 
the red dotted line. The only type of information that fails to exceed that threshold is Google 
searches. Thus, even under the most stringent Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test, the police 












 This paper provides evidence that the Third Party Doctrine contradicts the Reasonable 
Expectation of Privacy Test. This incompatibility is noteworthy because the Doctrine functions 
as an extension of Test. With the relationship between the Doctrine and the Test fractured, 
questions arise about Doctrine’s validity. My findings suggest that Americans overwhelmingly 
believe that several types of information relinquished to third parties can reasonably be expected 
to remain private. Though the Supreme Court affirmed the Doctrine’s authority in Carpenter, it 
Figure 4 The Percent of Americans that Believe There Is a Reasonable 
Expectation of Privacy from Everyone by Data Type  
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nevertheless began to chip away at the Doctrine’s foundation by holding that collecting 
someone’s cellphone location history requires a warrant. This ruling implicitly established a 
threshold to determine what information is entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy: If the 
proportion of Americans that believe Information-X can reasonably be expected to remain 
private exceeds the proportion of Americans that believe cellphone location can reasonably be 
expected to remain private, then Information-X must also be entitled to a reasonable expectation 
of privacy.  
My findings suggest that public opinion about email history, banking records, Nest data, 
Google searches, and call logs all exceed the Carpenter threshold. Therefore, under Katz’s 
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test, each of these types of information merits a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. It’s unclear whether those kinds of information would be entitled to a 
reasonable expectation of privacy under Miller. The Supreme Court may well decide to abandon 
Katz in favor of Miller, but if the Court chooses to preserve Katz, then collecting each of the 
aforementioned types of information will require a warrant. Arguing whether Katz or Miller is a 
better precedent for the Court going forward is beyond the purview of this paper, but this debate 
opens other avenues for further inquiry. 
One potential limit on the generalizability of this paper is that my survey was distributed 
to approximately 1,000 respondents. To more accurately depict society’s views about what 
information can reasonably be expected to remain private, additional surveys are needed. It is 
crucial that future survey questions employ similar (if not the same) language if they are to be 
compared. Once we have data from several rounds of surveys, we can then confidently assert 
what kinds of information the public believes are entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
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Finally, it is worth reemphasizing the unusual nature of the Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy Test. There are only a handful of domains in which the Supreme Court defers to the 
judgment of society; the Test happens to be one. As a result, the findings of this paper are 
directly relevant to determining the merits of the Third Party Doctrine. In most other situations, 
conducting a survey to measure society’s views about a contentious legal issue might be 
illuminating for political reasons, but the results of that survey would carry little weight in the 
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Appendix A: Full Survey Text 
Q49 Cell phone service providers (such as Verizon and AT&T) keep a permanent record of all 
calls that each person makes or receives. Please choose the statement that best describes your 
opinion about the privacy of this information.  
oI believe that it is reasonable for someone to expect that this information be kept private 
from everyone. (1)  
oI believe that it is reasonable for someone to expect that this information be shared with 
potential advertisers (but not the government). (2)  
oI believe that it is reasonable for someone to expect that this information be shared with the 
government (but not potential advertisers). (3)  
oI believe that it is reasonable for someone to expect that this information be shared with 
both the government and potential advertisers. (4)  
 
Q50 Internet search browsers (such as Google and Bing) keep a permanent record of 
everyone’s internet searches. Please choose the statement that best describes your opinion 
about the privacy of this information.  
oI believe that it is reasonable for someone to expect that this information be kept private 
from everyone. (1)  
oI believe that it is reasonable for someone to expect that this information be shared with 
potential advertisers (but not the government). (2)  
oI believe that it is reasonable for someone to expect that this information be shared with the 
government (but not potential advertisers). (3)  
oI believe that it is reasonable for someone to expect that this information be shared with 
both the government and potential advertisers. (4)  
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Q51 New in-home thermostats (such as Nest) can detect whether people are home and adjust 
the temperature accordingly. These thermostats permanently store information about when 
people are home so that the device can look for patterns in order to become more energy 
efficient. Please choose the statement that best describes your opinion about the privacy of this 
information.  
oI believe that it is reasonable for someone to expect that this information be kept private 
from everyone. (1)  
oI believe that it is reasonable for someone to expect that this information be shared with 
potential advertisers (but not the government). (2)  
oI believe that it is reasonable for someone to expect that this information be shared with the 
government (but not potential advertisers). (3)  
oI believe that it is reasonable for someone to expect that this information be shared with 
both the government and potential advertisers. (4)  
Q52 Smartphones (such as iPhones and Androids) automatically track and permanently store 
the location of the person carrying a phone at any given time. Please choose the statement that 
best describes your opinion about the privacy of this information.  
oI believe that it is reasonable for someone to expect that this information be kept private 
from everyone. (1)  
oI believe that it is reasonable for someone to expect that this information be shared with 
potential advertisers (but not the government). (2)  
oI believe that it is reasonable for someone to expect that this information be shared with the 
government (but not potential advertisers). (3)  
oI believe that it is reasonable for someone to expect that this information be shared with 
both the government and potential advertisers. (4)  
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Q53 Banks keep a permanent record of every purchase and ATM withdrawal that each person 
makes. Please choose the statement that best describes your opinion about the privacy of this 
information.  
oI believe that it is reasonable for someone to expect that this information be kept private 
from everyone. (1)  
oI believe that it is reasonable for someone to expect that this information be shared with 
potential advertisers (but not the government). (2)  
oI believe that it is reasonable for someone to expect that this information be shared with the 
government (but not potential advertisers). (3)  
oI believe that it is reasonable for someone to expect that this information be shared with 
both the government and potential advertisers. (4)  
Q54 Email account sponsors (such as Gmail) keep a permanent record of all emails that each 
person sends and receives. Please choose the statement that best describes your opinion about 
the privacy of this information.  
oI believe that it is reasonable for someone to expect that this information be kept private 
from everyone. (1)  
oI believe that it is reasonable for someone to expect that this information be shared with 
potential advertisers (but not the government) (2)  
oI believe that it is reasonable for someone to expect that this information be shared with the 
government (but not potential advertisers). (3)  
oI believe that it is reasonable for someone to expect that this information be shared with 
both the government and potential advertisers. (4)  
Q55 Which of the following statements apply to you? Please select all that apply.  
oI own a Google Home or Alexa device. (1)  
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oI own a smart thermostat, such as Nest. (2)  
oI have created an online banking account that is linked to my credit or debit card. (3)  
oMy credit or debit card information is stored on at least one website, such as Amazon. (4)  
oI have used an electronic money transferring app, such as Venmo, Cash App, or Zelle before. 
(5)  
Q56 Have you, a close friend, or a member of your family ever been investigated in connection 
to a crime?  
oYes (1) oNo (2)  
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Appendix B: Stata Code 
*First, I have to assign value labels to  
label define call 1 "entirely private" 2 
from advertisers not gov" 4 "no privacy" 
label values call call 
label define google 1 "entirely private" "private from advertisers not gov" 4 "no 
label values google google  
label define nest 1 "entirely private" 2 
from advertisers not gov" 4 "no privacy" 
label values nest nest 
each of my variables*  
"private from gov not advertisers" 3 "private  
2 "private from gov not advertisers" 3 privacy"  
"private from gov not advertisers" 3 "private  
label define location 1 "entirely private" 2 "private from gov not advertisers" 3 
"private from advertisers not gov" 4 "no privacy" 
label values location location  
label define bank 1 "entirely private" 2 "private from gov not advertisers" 3 "private 
from advertisers not gov" 4 "no privacy" 
label values bank bank  
label define email 1 "entirely private" 2 "private from gov not advertisers" 3 
"private from advertisers not gov" 4 "no privacy" 
label values email email  
label define savvy -99 "owns no technologies" 1 "owns 1 technology" 2 "owns 2 
technologies" 3 "owns 3 technologies" 4 "owns 4 technologies" 5 "owns 5 technologies" 
label values savvy savvy  
label define crime 1 "yes" 2 "no" label values crime crime  
*I then analyzed the findings at the base level, which comes into play when I discuss 
information that can reasonably be expected to remain private from everyone* 






*Next, I recoded the answer choices for the privacy questions. I combined choices 1 
and 2 into "Private from Government" (coded 0) and 
*combined choices 3 and 4 to make "Not private from government" (coded 1) 
recode call (1/2=0 "Private from Government") (3/4=1 "Not Private from Government") 
(.=.), gen(paper_call)  
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recode google (1/2=0 "Private from Government") (3/4=1 "Not Private from Government") 
(.=.), gen(paper_google)  
recode nest (1/2=0 "Private from Government") (3/4=1 "Not Private from Government") 
(.=.), gen(paper_nest)  
recode location (1/2=0 "Private from Government") (3/4=1 "Not Private from 
Government") (.=.), gen(paper_location) 
recode bank (1/2=0 "Private from Government") (3/4=1 "Not Private from Government") 
(.=.), gen(paper_bank) 
recode email (1/2=0 "Private from Government") (3/4=1 "Not Private from Government") 
(.=.), gen(paper_email) 
*I then recoded the tech-savvy question. Those with 2 or less technologies were coded 
as "low" and those with 
*with 3-5 technologies were coded as "high"* 
recode savvy (-99/2=0 "Low Savvy") (3/5=1 "Highly savvy") (.=.), gen(paper_savvy)  
*analyzing the privacy data with tech-savvy control*  
tab paper_call paper_savvy, col nofreq nokey 
tab paper_google paper_savvy, col nofreq nokey  
tab paper_nest paper_savvy, col nofreq nokey 
tab paper_location paper_savvy, col nofreq nokey 
tab paper_bank paper_savvy, col nofreq nokey 
tab paper_email paper_savvy, col nofreq nokey 
*analyzing the privacy data with crime control*  
tab paper_call crime, col nofreq nokey tab paper_google crime, col nofreq nokey tab 
paper_nest crime, col nofreq nokey tab paper_location crime, col nofreq nokey tab 
paper_bank crime, col nofreq nokey tab paper_email crime, col nofreq nokey  
 
